Inside the A-CDC Act 2025: The Powers Few Are Talking About
Australians expect their government to move quickly when things go wrong — fire, flood, disease, you name it. We understand the need for urgency in a crisis. What most of us don’t expect is a law that makes those emergency-style powers permanent and hands them to a single statutory office.
That’s where the A-CDC Act 2025 lands. On paper, it creates a national authority to strengthen surveillance, coordinate outbreaks and modernise public-health systems. All reasonable goals. But deep in the legislation are powers that go much further than routine administration. They reshape how information flows, who can demand it and what protections remain when the Director-General calls the shots.
These are the parts of the Act that deserve daylight.
Section 45 — Compulsory Directions With a Wide Reach
Section 45 gives the A-CDC’s Director-General the authority to issue directions requiring any person to provide information. That can include:
state or territory officials
private laboratories
universities
health practitioners
companies holding relevant data
individuals in possession of specified information
It’s a powerful clause because it isn’t tied to a formal emergency. The Director-General does not need a declaration or ministerial approval. The threshold is simply whether the information is considered relevant to a public-health purpose under the Act.
In practice, this creates a standing power — always on, always available — that other agencies typically hold only during extraordinary circumstances.
Section 46 — Directions Override Other Laws
Section 46 ensures these directions aren’t slowed down by competing legislation. It states that a direction issued under Section 45 has effect even if another Commonwealth, State or Territory law would ordinarily restrict the disclosure of that information.
This includes:
privacy legislation
confidentiality provisions
state-based public-health protections
medical-records requirements
Normally, public agencies must balance competing rules. Section 46 clears the path. If there’s a conflict, the A-CDC direction wins.
Supporters argue it prevents bottlenecks. Critics point out that oversight mechanisms struggle when one Act can effectively overrule the rest.
Section 67 — Data-Sharing Declarations Without Parliamentary Review
Section 67 broadens things further.
The Director-General can issue a data-sharing declaration whenever there is a “real or perceived threat” to public health. That declaration authorises:
the sharing of personal information
between Commonwealth and State agencies
or with international partners where appropriate
There is no requirement for Cabinet sign-off. No requirement for the responsible Minister to approve it. And a key line in Section 67(6) removes Parliament’s power to disallow the declaration.
Once made, it stands.
The threshold — “real or perceived threat” — is deliberately broad. That doesn’t mean it will be misused, but it does mean the law gives substantial discretion to one office with no built-in review before activation.
Section 70 — The Override Clause That Locks It All In
Section 70 ties the scheme together. It confirms that authorisations under these provisions operate:
“despite any other law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.”
This is what gives the earlier sections their force. Without Section 70, there would be legal arguments about whether privacy rules or state health statutes could limit the A-CDC’s powers. Section 70 resolves the question: they can’t.
This override applies even outside declared emergencies. It's part of the everyday functioning of the A-CDC.
Fail to comply with a lawful direction and you face a civil penalty of up to 60 penalty units — roughly $18,780 at current rates.
Where the Debate Really Sits
The A-CDC Act isn’t difficult to understand; it’s simply hard to believe. The stated aim is efficiency, and in practice these powers may well make national coordination smoother. No one disputes the need for fast action during genuine threats.
The concern is about discretion. When one unelected statutory officer can:
demand information from almost anyone,
override conflicting laws,
authorise personal-data exchange with foreign bodies, and
do all of this without ministerial or parliamentary approval,
the balance between speed and accountability shifts.
That doesn’t make the A-CDC illegitimate. It makes it powerful. And powerful institutions need to be understood — not after something goes wrong, but long before.
What Matters Now
These provisions have already passed Parliament. They are not hypothetical. They apply whether there’s an emergency or not. And most Australians have never heard them explained.
Accountability only works when people know what has been authorised in their name. With powers this broad, transparency isn’t optional — it’s essential.
For a deeper breakdown of each section, including direct legislative excerpts and case examples, see Chapter Three of Bureaucracy in the Bloodstream.